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Author(s): Pyong Gap Min
Source: International Migration Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Spring, 1992), pp. 4-21
Published by: The Center for Migration Studies of New York, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2546934
Accessed: 22/04/2009 20:29

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A Comparison of the Korean Minorities in China and Japan

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Approximately 1.8 million Koreans are settled in China and some 700,000 Koreans are located in Japan. The Korean minorities in two neighboring Asian countries make an interesting contrast in adjustment and ethnicity. Whereas the Koreans in China have maintained high levels of ethnic autonomy and positive ethnic identity, the Korean Japanese have lost much of their cultural repertoire and have suffered from negative ethnic identity. This paper provides a comparative analysis, explaining why the Koreans in two countries have made the different adjustments. It focuses on the basic differences in minority policy between China and Japan, the difference in the context of migration, the existence or absence of a territorial base, and the differential levels of influence from Korea. This comparative analysis is theoretically valuable because it has demonstrated that the physical and cultural differences between the majority group and a minority group are not necessary conditions for prejudice and discrimination against the minority group.

Minority groups in different societies make different kinds of adjustment. Some minority groups, such as African Americans in the antebellum South, have lost much of their cultural repertoire and received a high level of discrimination. Other minority groups have maintained a high level of cultural autonomy and ethnic identity. Social scientists have emphasized physical and cultural differences between the dominant group and a particular minority group in explaining the pattern of a minority group's adjustment. First, minorities have been defined as those groups with physical and cultural characteristics that distinguish them from the dominant group. For example, Wirth, one of the few early American theorists on ethnic relations, defined a minority group as "a group of people who,

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1 This is a revision of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Mid-South Sociological Association, Baton Rouge, October 18–22, 1989. I acknowledge thanks to anonymous reviewers of International Migration Review for providing helpful comments on the earlier version of this paper.
because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination” (Wirth, 1945:347). Noel (1968) theorized that ethnocentrism based on physical and cultural differences between two groups is a necessary condition for ethnic stratification.

Social scientists seem to have emphasized physical and cultural differences between the dominant group and a minority group in explaining the pattern of a minority group’s adjustment mainly because they have focused on minority groups in White-dominated societies. When we look at minority groups in non-White societies, we may be able to find other important factors that determine majority-minority relations.

This article compares the Korean minorities in China and Japan in their differential levels of cultural autonomy and ethnic identity. Koreans, Chinese and Japanese all belong to the Mongolian race, and thus the Koreans in both societies are not separable from the dominant group in physical characteristics. Moreover, all three groups have many cultural similarities, particularly associated with Confucianism. However, the Korean minority groups settled in the two Asian societies have made radically different kinds of adjustment. The Koreans in China have maintained remarkably high levels of cultural autonomy and ethnic identity, whereas the Koreans in Japan have lost most of their cultural tradition, including the Korean language. In explaining the differential levels of ethnicity between the two Korean minority groups, this paper focuses on the basic differences in minority policy between the two countries; the difference in the context of migration; the existence or absence of a territorial base; and the differential levels of influence from Korea.

DIFFERENTIAL LEVELS OF CULTURAL AUTONOMY AND ETHNIC IDENTITY

The Koreans in China

The immigration of Koreans to China in large numbers started in the 1880s, when tens of thousands of poor Korean farmers crossed the northern border to China. It accelerated after 1910 when Korea was annexed by Japan (Table 1). The Japanese colonial economic policy in Korea left many Korean farmers landless, and a large number of poverty-stricken farmers in the northern provinces moved to the Yanbian area, the northeastern part of China, and Siberia to avoid economic hardship at home (see, Fig. 1). Other Korean immigrants were recruited as laborers by the Japanese government as the latter had control over Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War in
1905. Still others moved to China to organize Korean independence movements against Japan. The 1982 Chinese national census shows that approximately 1.8 million Koreans were settled in China, constituting the eleventh largest minority group in the country (C. Lee, 1986). The 1.8 million Koreans in China account for 40 percent of total overseas Koreans (4.5 million), making up the largest overseas Korean group.

Since the establishment of the Communist government in China in 1949, only a small number of Koreans in North Korea have immigrated to China (C. Lee, 1986), and people from South Korea had not been allowed to visit China until 1989. Thus, an overwhelming majority of the Koreans in China were born in China, with second and third generation Koreans constituting the majority. Nevertheless, the Koreans in China have maintained high levels of Korean cultural autonomy and Korean ethnic identity.

An overwhelming majority of China’s 1.8 million Koreans are concentrated in the northeastern region (Manchuria), which is close to the Chinese border to North Korea, and 42 percent of them reside in the Yanbian area.
The Chinese government established the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in 1952, which gave institutional support to Koreans' cultural and political autonomy in the Yanbian area. In other parts of China, one Korean Autonomous District and 32 Korean Autonomous Villages were established in the 1950s (Hwang, 1986). Although Koreans constitute only about 40 percent of the total population of the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture, they control the local government. Eleven of fifteen major government agencies and departments are headed by Koreans, and approx-
imately 70 percent of 300 deputies to the Yanbian People's Congress are Koreans (C. Lee, 1986).

The Korean minority's political autonomy has facilitated maintenance of the Korean language and the ethnically-based educational system in the Yanbian area and other parts of China's northeastern region. In 1952, the Yanbian government decided to issue all official documents in both Chinese and Korean languages and set up a government bureau to translate Chinese documents into Korean. Korean ethnic schools have been established at all levels—primary, secondary and higher educational programs—and almost all Korean children in Yanbian (more than 90%) attend Korean ethnic schools (C. Lee, 1986). In Korean ethnic schools, Korean teachers give instructions in Korean for all subjects, with the exception of those related to the Chinese language and literature. Hundreds of books have been translated and published in Korean for Korean school students, and 75 percent of the materials used for Korean language and literature courses are translated or written in Korean. The Yanbian School of Fine Arts, established in 1957 and open only to Korean students, specializes in Korean art, music and dance. In addition, the Yanbian University, founded as a Korean national university in 1949, has three centers focusing on the Korean language, literature, history, economy, art, music and philosophy (I. Park, 1986). All ethnic schools are funded by the Chinese government.

Some readers may wonder whether the segregation of Korean children into Korean language schools in China is educationally disadvantageous, particularly at the college level. Considering the current status of minority education in the United States, this may be a reasonable expectation. However, the Koreans in China have received national recognition for their success in education. In terms of achievement in standardized tests and percentages of high school and college graduates, the Koreans not only do better than any other minority group in China, they also outperform the Hans, the majority group in China. For example, 175.3 Koreans completed four years of college per 10,000 Koreans six years old and over, compared to 72.9 for the total Chinese population and 31.6 for all minorities (C. Lee, 1986).

Koreans' physical segregation in the Yanbian area and other parts of China, the ethnically-based educational system, and probably Koreans' cultural homogeneity all contribute to their cultural autonomy and ethnic identity in China. Although survey data are not available, journalistic reports by Korean scholars from China and Korean American visitors to China indicate that China's Koreans maintain a high level of ethnicity, culturally and socially. First, the Koreans in China have been successful in maintaining their ethnic language. One informal survey shows that only 10
percent of the Koreans in China have lost their ethnic language and that the language maintenance rate is relatively high even in those areas where Koreans do not concentrate (I. Park, 1986). The Koreans in China are also successful in maintaining traditional Korean customs, games and values. The Yanbian Korean community has not been significantly influenced by modernization waves, whereas South Korea has experienced radical changes associated with industrialization, urbanization and Westernization. Partly for this reason, the Yanbian Korean community has been more successful than South Korea in preserving some traditional Korean folk songs, folk dances and folk games (Hwang, 1986). They have also retained traditional Korean food customs. The vast majority of China’s Koreans, whether they live in rural or urban areas, mainly depend upon traditional Korean food which consists of rice, kimchi and bean soup. Koreans were traditionally known as a “rice raising people,” and the Koreans in China have been successful in rice farming. Soccer and volleyball have been the two most popular national games in Korea, and Korean ethnic schools in China have earned national reputation for these two sports (I. Park, 1986).

Koreans’ segregation in the Yanbian and other areas, their political autonomy, the ethnically-oriented educational system, and sustenance of ethnic subculture also promote a high level of ethnic identity. The Koreans who reside in the Yanbian region and other ethnic enclaves maintain social interactions largely with co-ethnic members. Even those Koreans who do not live in ethnic enclaves are known to be actively involved in ethnic networks (Hwang, 1986). The Koreans in China are generally proud of their ethnic background and consider themselves Koreans, rather than Korean Chinese. It is a well known fact that hundreds of Korean families in China who had lost their Korean nationality over the course of many generations have applied for a change of nationality from the Han to the Korean during recent years (B. Park, 1986b). Korean young people in China are under strong pressure, not only from parents but also from the Korean community as a whole, to date and marry co-ethnic members. Those few Koreans who violate this norm are very often isolated from the ethnic community. Thus, outmarriage is very rare, although hard data on the outmarriage rate are not available.

The Koreans in Japan

The 1986 report shows that there were approximately 670,000 Koreans in Japan, which constituted 86 percent of the alien residents in the country (B. Park, 1990). Immigration of Koreans to Japan in large numbers started after the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 (Table 2). In 1912, the Japanese colonial administration in Korea started the so-called “land survey” for
TABLE 2
KOREAN POPULATION IN JAPAN, 1915–1947

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>3,989</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>318,212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>5,638</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>390,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>14,501</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>466,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>22,262</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>537,576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>28,272</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>625,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>30,175</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>690,501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>35,876</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>735,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>59,865</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>799,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>80,617</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>961,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>120,258</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,190,444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>133,710</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,469,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>148,503</td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>1,625,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>175,911</td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>1,882,456</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>243,328</td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,936,843</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>276,031</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>598,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>298,091</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Yoo Han Lee, (1986).

It appropriated a vast amount of land from the earlier Korean kingdom and people, and distributed it to Japanese citizens. Many Korean farmers, deprived of their lands, were pushed to move to other countries to make a living (Mitchell, 1967). Due largely to geographical proximity, many displaced workers from South Korea migrated to Japan, whereas most migrants from North Korea went to the northern part of China (see, Fig. 1). The Korean population in Japan was close to 800,000 in 1938.

Whereas before 1939 the economic dislocation in Korea due to the Japanese colonial economic policy pushed a large number of Koreans to Japan, during the seven-year period between 1939 and 1945 more than 800,000 Koreans were involuntarily brought to Japan as labor and military conscripts (Lee and De Vos, 1984:53). As Japan's war on the mainland expanded after 1939 and as the Pacific War was imminent in 1941, the Japanese colonial government took Korean laborers and military draftees to Japan to fill the manpower vacuum created by the expansion of the forces and the war economy. Most Korean conscripted laborers were engaged in coal mining in Japan, which was considered unattractive by the Japanese
because of wretched safety provisions, low wages and poor working conditions (Lee and De Vos, 1984:52–53). In 1944, the Japanese Diet passed the Japanese Labor Conscription Act, under which all Korean males were subject to mobilization by fiat. Moreover, Korean young people were forced to serve under the Japanese military draft. By an unofficial estimation, the Korean population in Japan in 1945 was close to 2 million, and more than half of them went back to Korea after the end of World War II (Y. Lee, 1986). As Table 2 shows, in 1947 there were less than 600,000 Koreans in Japan.

As is clear from an overview of immigration history, the Koreans in Japan, like those in China, largely consist of native-born second and third generation Koreans. A survey conducted in 1985 indicates that first generation Koreans account for only 11.2 percent (Y. Lee, 1986). Although the two Korean minorities in China and Japan consist largely of native-born Koreans, they significantly differ in the level of ethnicity. In sharp contrast with the Korean minority in China, the Korean minority in Japan has lost much of its ethnic subculture and ethnic identity.

Japan's Koreans do not have the kind of residential concentration that favors ethnic interactions among the Koreans in China. Although the Koreans in Japan concentrate in several major cities, with Korean ethnic ghettos in cities such as Osaka and Tokyo (Lee and De Vos, 1984:226), they are much more widely scattered than the Koreans in China. Of course, they have central political organizations that try to unite all Korean residents in Japan. However, physical distance makes central coordination very difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, central organizations are ideologically divided into two camps: Mindan and Chongnyon. Mindan is a Korean organization that supports South Korea, whereas Chongnyon follows the ideological line of the North Korean communist government.

Maintenance of the native language is one important indicator of ethnic survival for a minority group in any society. By this measure, the Korean minority in Japan has lost most of its ethnicity, since the majority of Japan-born Koreans do not know the Korean language (Y. Lee, 1986). The inability of most Korean Japanese children to acquire their ethnic language has much to do with the educational system as well as with the overall minority policy in Japan. It was previously noted that 90 percent of Korean children in China attend Korean ethnic schools, which are funded by the Chinese government. In contrast, less than 20 percent of Korean children in Japan attend Korean ethnic schools, and the remaining Korean children attending regular Japanese schools have no exposure to the Korean language and literature through formal education (Jung, 1990; B. Park, 1986a). The Japanese government does not provide any financial support for Korean ethnic schools. Almost all Korean ethnic schools belong to
Chongnyon and are funded entirely by North Korea for the purpose of propaganda. The Japanese government not only provides no financial support for Korean ethnic education, but also discourages it. In 1949, several Korean ethnic schools were forced to close by the Japanese government.

The identity problem of Japan's Koreans is also reflected in their reluctance to use Korean names. A Japan-born Korean is physically indistinguishable from a Japanese as long as he/she has a Japanese name. Afraid of prejudice and discrimination against Koreans, many change their Korean name to Japanese. It is known that only two out of ten Korean students use their Korean names when they register for Japanese high schools (Lee and De Vos, 1984:188). The reluctance of Korean children to use their Korean names in Japanese schools is closely related to their low self-esteem as Koreans, which results from prejudice and discrimination against Koreans. In a survey conducted in 1975, 164 Korean students in a Japanese high school were asked the following question: "What do you think about being born Korean?" Only 27.4 percent reported that they felt proud of being Korean, whereas 20 percent indicated that they would like to be Japanese (Lee and De Vos, 1984:193).

The tendency to hide their Korean background is not limited to Japan-born Korean children. Korean Japanese specialists indicate that first generation Korean adults very often conceal their heritage in public life (Y. Kim, 1989a, 1989b). Especially those Koreans in Japan who have achieved great success in the business, entertainment and sports worlds, and thus who receive much publicity, tend to hide their nationality. For example, the president of the Lotte Company, who was selected as the fourth richest person in the world by Forbes Magazine (July, 1989), is a Korean Japanese, but his Korean nationality is not known to the Japanese public (Y. Kim, 1989a). Korean scholars who study Korean Japanese indicate that more publicly known Koreans in Japan try to hide their nationality because such an identification might have serious negative effects on their reputations.

The low level of ethnic attachment on the part of the Koreans in Japan is also demonstrated by a high rate of intermarriage. According to a survey conducted in 1984 (Y. Lee, 1986), the Koreans who married Japanese constitute 40 percent of all married Koreans. A high intermarriage rate does not necessarily mean that Koreans are well accepted by the Japanese. In many cases, Korean children act like Japanese when they date Japanese partners. However, once their Korean background is known to the Japanese partners, the relationship often ends (Lee and De Vos, 1984). Moreover, many intermarried Korean-Japanese couples have serious adjustment problems associated with their nationality differences, and Japanese partners’
and/or their parents' prejudices against Koreans is known to be a source of marital problems. The high intermarriage rate between Koreans and Japanese seems to be due more to Koreans' tenuous ethnic identity and their readiness to accept Japanese partners than to Japanese partners' readiness to accept Koreans. This speculation seems reasonable when we look at the results of an attitude survey. When asked whether they approve of Japanese-Korean intermarriage, 32.3 percent of the Korean respondents indicated approval compared to only 8.2 percent of the Japanese respondents (Lee and De Vos, 1984:193).

It has been indicated in the foregoing paragraphs that the Koreans in Japan, compared to the Korean Chinese, maintain low levels of ethnic subculture and ethnic identity. However, this should not be interpreted as meaning that Korean Japanese have no sense of ethnic identity at all. The minority group identity can be shaped partly because of the special treatment the group receives from the majority group. The Koreans in Japan are subject to discrimination and prejudice. As Lee and De Vos (1984) have adequately indicated, their negative experiences contribute to the development of ethnic identity. Most Koreans in Japan are very conscious of their Korean ethnic background in the private world, but many are reluctant to identify themselves as Korean in public life for fear of prejudice and discrimination. As a result, they suffer from identity crises, negative self-identity, or self-negation (Lee and De Vos, 1984). These psychological conflicts on the part of many young Koreans in Japan lead to juvenile delinquency and even suicide.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO DIFFERENTIAL LEVELS OF ETHNICITY

It has thus far been noted that the two Korean minority groups settled in China and Japan show significantly differential levels of ethnicity. The Koreans in China maintain high levels of Korean ethnic subculture and ethnic identity, whereas Japan's Koreans have lost much of the Korean cultural tradition and suffer from negative ethnic identity. The fact that China's Koreans are more successful in ethnic education and maintaining cultural autonomy than other minority groups in China can be explained largely by cultural factors—Koreans' emphasis on education and cultural similarities between Koreans and the Han Chinese associated with Confucianism. However, that the Korean minorities in China and Japan significantly differ in the level of ethnicity can be explained neither by Korean cultural factors nor by physical and cultural similarities. For, as already indicated, all three Asian groups bear physical and cultural similar-
ities. We need to look at structural and contextual differences to explain the differential levels of ethnicity between the two Korean minority groups.

**Differences in Minority Policy**

China and Japan have radically different kinds of minority policy, and these differences seem largely to determine differences in adjustment between the two Korean minorities. Although there have been fluctuations over the course of history, China has generally taken the policy of recognizing the functional value of ethnic diversity and encouraging maintenance of minority languages and customs. In sharp contrast with the Chinese pluralist policy, Japan has adopted the monolithic assimilationist policy based on the idea of the Japanese as an ethnically homogenous group.

From its inception, the Chinese Communist government emphasized ethnic equality and ethnic autonomy and tried to abolish the colonial educational system adopted by Japan in her occupied territory, Manchuria. A landmark in China's policy toward ethnic autonomy was the Regulations on Autonomy of Minority Areas adopted by the Communist State Council in 1952. The regulations helped to establish politically autonomous regions for Koreans and other minority groups such as Mongolian and Hui peoples. The Second National Conference on Minority Education held in 1956 adopted a twelve-year plan to strengthen instruction in minority languages, to publish minority language textbooks, and to train minority teachers (C. Lee, 1986:68). This further reinforced the development of ethnic education for Koreans and other minority groups.

The Chinese minority policy suffered a setback during the Rectification Movement (1957–1959) and the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). During these two major political movements, especially during the latter period, radical leftist leaders pursued an ideologically inspired monistic and integrationist policy toward minority nationalities and gave high priority to the ultimate goals of national unity and political centralization. Publication of ethnic language books, newspapers and magazines was halted or restricted, and many minority native language writers and poets were imprisoned. Minority children in ethnic schools were required to spend more time learning Chinese at the sacrifice of their own native languages.

After the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese leaders reinstated the original minority policy allowing for a great degree of ethnic diversity and minority autonomy. The Chinese government restored the use of a minority language in ethnic schools, provided additional funds for construction of minority schools, developed textbooks in minority languages, and paid more attention to training minority cadres and teachers (C. Lee, 1986:100). To increase the college enrollment of minority students, the Chinese gov-
ernment has allowed minority students to take the national entrance examinations in their own languages and admitted them to colleges with lower scores than Han Chinese students. They have also established a minimum quota for minority college students in the autonomous areas. The Chinese government’s pluralistic minority policy in general and ethnic education program in particular is the most important factor for the Korean minority’s success in maintaining ethnic subculture and ethnic identity.

If Communist China represents one extreme in emphasizing ethnic equality and ethnic autonomy, Japan represents the other extreme. Historically, the Japanese have believed in the purity of their race, which has been reinforced by the mythology that the Japanese were descended from indigenous gods. The 700,000 Koreans constitute the only significant minority group in Japan. Although the Koreans are physically indistinguishable from the Japanese and although there are important cultural similarities between the two groups, many Japanese still tend to consider Koreans biologically inferior (Lee and De Vos, 1984:356).

The Japanese government’s minority policy largely reflects the attitudes of the general public. The Japanese government has not recognized Koreans as a minority group. Instead, it has treated Koreans as aliens who either have to be naturalized and invisibly assimilated into Japanese society or have to be repatriated to Korea (Y. Kim, 1989a; Lee and De Vos, 1984; B. Park, 1989). Available data indicate that nearly 140,000 Koreans were naturalized as Japanese citizens between 1952 and 1969 (B. Park, 1990). Naturalized Koreans are required to give up their Korean name and discouraged from maintaining the Korean language and other Korean customs. For this reason, most Korean Japanese have chosen to remain as unnaturalized aliens, although an overwhelming majority of them were born in Japan. The Japanese government labels unnaturalized Koreans as “long-term aliens” rather than as permanent residents, which means that Koreans’ permanent residence in Japan is never guaranteed. The Koreans who maintain their alien status receive all kinds of legal discrimination. One very controversial discriminatory policy is the requirement that all aliens file an alien registration with their fingerprints. Alien Koreans are not eligible for pensions and other welfare benefits, although they pay regular taxes (S. Choi, 1986).

The basic differences between Japanese and Chinese governments in minority policy are most clearly manifested in educational policy. Whereas the Chinese government has encouraged ethnic education and provided financial support for ethnic schools, the Japanese government has made all efforts to hamper Korean ethnic education. In 1949, the Japanese government abolished 92 of 337 Korean language schools and made Korean
language education impossible in the remaining Korean schools by incorporating them into the Japanese public educational system (H. C. Kim, 1989). The Japanese government currently does not provide financial support for Korean ethnic schools and does not offer Korean ethnic education for Japanese public schools with many Korean students. Japan also enforced the monolithic assimilationist educational policy in Korea and China during the colonial period. The use of the Korean language was banned and Japanese was the exclusive medium of instruction in Korean schools in Korea and Manchuria (C. Lee, 1986), both of which were under the Japanese colonial rule for approximately 35 years until the end of World War II.

The basic differences in minority policy between China and Japan are somewhat related to the difference in their economic systems. The policy of ethnic autonomy in education is possible in China partly because there are no great individual differences in rewards on education in the society. The admission of minority students to colleges and universities on an affirmative action basis is not a sensitive social issue in China because college education there does not make much difference in social rewards, particularly in income.

By contrast, contemporary Japan is a highly stratified capitalist society in which individuals receive social rewards largely based on their educational credentials. Japanese political leaders, of course, have no intention of treating Korean students favorably in college admission. However, should they have the intention, such a policy would be likely to encounter strong public opposition, since in Japan whether or not one graduates from a college and from what college one graduates largely determine one's social status and income. This observation suggests that not much could be done in the United States to achieve racial equality in education without changing the economic system itself.

Immigrant vs. Colonized Minorities

In his attempt to explain race relations in the United States, Blauner (1972) made a distinction between colonized and immigrant minorities. Colonized minorities were conquered or entered unwillingly, whereas immigrant minorities came to the United States voluntarily. Indians, Mexicans and African Americans fit the category of colonized minorities and European white immigrant groups fit the other category. Blauner argued that the nature of this initial contact very much determined subsequent intergroup relations. The White majority group in the United States treated colonized minorities in the same manner that White people treated colonized nationalities in Third World countries.
Blauner's thesis of internal colonialism seems to be useful in understanding the different kinds of treatment that the Korean minorities in China and Japan have received. Korea was a colony of Japan between 1910 and 1945, and an overwhelming majority of Koreans in Japan were involuntary migrants during the colonial period or are their descendants. Those Koreans who moved to Japan before 1939 were more voluntary migrants than the post-1939 labor and military conscripts. But even these early Korean migrants were involuntary migrants in the sense that economic dislocations in Korea caused by the Japanese colonial policy and economic exploitation pushed them to Japan. Moreover, all Korean residents in Japan, both more voluntary earlier migrants and later labor and military conscripts, were treated as subjects of a colony. Although Korea became politically independent from Japan after the end of World War II, the history of colonization seems to have had a powerful psychological influence on both the Japanese government and the general public in dealing with Korean residents. Many Japanese, including political leaders, still seem unable to dispel the conviction that Koreans are inferior to the Japanese.

The Koreans in China differ significantly from those in Japan in their relations to the host society and the context of migration. Over the long course of history, Korea was politically and culturally dependent upon China. However, Korea maintained her political independence from China when the vast majority of Korean migrants moved to Manchuria in the early twentieth century. As previously indicated, many Koreans were pushed to China, as they were pushed to Japan, by internal poverty. Yet, no significant group of Koreans was taken to China in the same involuntary manner that Korean labor and military conscripts were taken to Japan between 1939 and 1945.

Moreover, Korean migrants, unlike those in Japan, were accepted as equals by the Chinese. When Manchuria was occupied by the Japanese after the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, many Korean political leaders there, along with the Chinese, fought against the Japanese colonization. The Korean minority was the only major minority group in China that had a record of strong resistance to Japanese imperialism comparable to the Han Chinese. The common colonial experience and resistance to Japanese imperialism have led the Han people and the Han-dominated Chinese government to be more friendly toward the Korean minority than toward other minority groups (Hwang, 1989).

The Presence or Absence of a Territorial Base

Third, the differential levels of residential segregation between the two Korean minorities contribute to the differential levels of ethnic heritage. As
previously noted, approximately 40 percent of the Koreans in China concentrate in Yanbian, a geographically isolated area. The concentration of the Korean Chinese in the Yanbian area provides a territorial basis for ethnic autonomy and ethnic identity. Koreans’ residential concentration encourages social interactions among Koreans, thereby facilitating maintenance of the Korean language, literature, food and customs. Moreover, Yanbian as the Korean cultural, social and psychological center reinforces ethnic identity for the Koreans in other parts of China.

Unfortunately, however, the Korean Japanese do not have a similar territorial basis for ethnic interaction and ethnic identity. As noted in the preceding section, the Korean Japanese are much more widely scattered than are Koreans in China, although they have concentrated in several major metropolitan cities such as Osaka and Tokyo.

The level of intercity migration among Koreans as well as Japanese in these metropolitan cities has been very high. The Korean Japanese in several major Korean centers have developed ethnic ghettos. Yet, more economically successful Korean Japanese have moved to suburban areas, away from ethnic ghettos (De Vos and Lee, 1985). By contrast, the Korean Chinese have largely concentrated in Yanbian and other rural areas, where the level of internal migration has been exceptionally low, and thus they have been able to maintain traditional Korean customs and values. This suggests that the differentials in levels of urbanization and industrialization have affected the difference in ethnic segregation patterns between the two Korean minorities, which have in turn contributed to the differential in the level of ethnicity.

**Differential Levels of Influence from Korea**

The Korean Chinese have made closer contact with Korea than the Korean Japanese, and this should be considered another important factor that has determined the differential levels of ethnicity between the two Korean minorities. The physical proximity of Yanbian to North Korea has allowed many Korean Chinese to visit their relatives in North Korea (C. Lee, 1986:146–147). Many Koreans in North Korea have traveled also to the Yanbian area. This exchange of visits has contributed to maintenance of the Korean cultural tradition among the Korean Chinese. Moreover, the close political connection between China and North Korea has facilitated North Korea’s cultural penetration into China’s Korean minority. North Korea and Yanbian have exchanged a number of cultural programs through universities and other public organizations.

In contrast, the Korean community in Japan has not maintained close connections with Korea. Not only the physical, but also the political distance
between Japan and Korea has kept the Korean Japanese away from their native country. The anti-Japanese sentiments caused by Japan's colonization of Korea never disappeared after the political independence of Korea in 1945. Although South Korea established a normal diplomatic relationship with Japan in 1965, the relationship between the two countries has not been that smooth. Moreover, the South Korean government has not done much to negotiate with the Japanese government to protect the interests of the Korean Japanese, nor has it done much to provide cultural education for them. North Korea, as previously noted, has spent much more money than South Korea for the cultural education of Koreans in Japan. However, the North Korean government, which has not yet established diplomatic relations with Japan, has not been able to take diplomatic measures to protect the interests of their nationality in Japan.

In addition, the division of Korea into two halves and the split of the Korean Japanese into Mindan and Chongnyon have made it difficult to tie the Korean Japanese to their mother country. The divisions in Korea and the Korean Japanese community have also helped Japan to continue its discriminatory practices against the Korean Japanese.

CONCLUSION

This article has compared the two Korean minority groups settled in China and Japan in their adjustment, especially in the level of maintaining ethnic subculture and ethnic identity. The Koreans in China have maintained strikingly high levels of ethnic autonomy and positive ethnic identity, whereas Japan's Koreans have lost much of their cultural repertoire and suffered from negative ethnic identity. The following four factors have been indicated as the major determinants of the differential levels of ethnicity between the two Korean minority groups. First, China has adopted a pluralistic minority policy emphasizing ethnic autonomy, whereas Japan has taken a monolithic assimilationist policy, and this basic policy difference is the most important factor for understanding the differences in adjustment. Second, the two Korean minority groups significantly differ in the context of immigration, which also contributes to the differences in adjustment. The Korean minority in Japan is similar to U.S. "colonized minorities" in that its migration to Japan was rooted in the Japanese colonization of Korea, whereas the migration of Koreans to China was a voluntary, economic one. Third, the concentration of the Korean Chinese in the Yanbian area as a territorial base for the Korean cultural and psychological center has facilitated their ethnic attachment and ethnic identity, whereas the Korean Japanese do not have a comparable ethnic enclave. Fourth, North Korea is geographically and ideologically close to China and thus has had much
cultural and political influence on the Korean Chinese community, whereas neither South Korea nor North Korea has had much influence on the Korean Japanese community.

The descriptive information provided by this article concerning China’s and Japan’s minority policies seems as important as the information on the Korean minorities themselves, since little is known about them. No scholarly article dealing with either China’s or Japan’s minority policies seems available to American readers, although many studies dealing with the Chinese or the Japanese as a minority group in the United States have been published. Japanese scholars specializing in Japanese Americans have taken very critical attitudes toward U.S. minority policies, especially as they negatively affect Japanese Americans. Hopefully this article will provide the Japanese American scholars with the opportunity to think about Japan’s own minority policy.

Moreover, this comparative study, albeit more descriptive than explanatory, has some theoretical bearing. Researchers interested in ethnicity have emphasized historical and cultural commonalities among members as essential to ethnic survival for a particular minority group. The fact that the two Korean minority groups sharing the almost same historical and cultural tradition exhibit differential levels of ethnicity indicates that historical and cultural connections may be less important for understanding ethnicity than some researchers might have had us believe. Scholars of majority-minority relations have emphasized also physical and cultural differences between the majority and minority groups as a necessary condition for prejudice and discrimination against the minority group. This comparative analysis, however, demonstrates that while Koreans are physically indistinguishable from the Japanese and the Chinese and very similar in cultural characteristics, the Korean minority groups in the two Asian countries have received different kinds of treatment. Thus, it suggests that one group can ruthlessly discriminate against another physically and culturally similar group when other conditions are met.

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